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Using an industry-level dataset of production and trade spanning 75 countries and 5 decades,
and a fully specied multi-sector Ricardian model, we estimate productivities at sector level
and examine how they evolve over time in both developed and developing countries. We nd
that in both country groups, comparative advantage has become weaker: productivity grew
systematically faster in sectors that were initially at the greater comparative disadvantage. The
global welfare implications of this phenomenon are signicant. Relative to the counterfactual
scenario in which an individual country's comparative advantage remained the same as in the
1960s, and technology in all sectors grew at the same country-specic average rate, welfare
today is 1.9% lower at the median. The welfare impact varies greatly across countries, ranging
from  0.5% to 6% among OECD countries, and from  9% to 27% among non-OECD countries.
Remarkably, for the OECD countries, nearly all of the welfare impact is driven by changes
in technology in OECD countries, and for the non-OECD countries, nearly all of the welfare
impact is driven by changes in technology in non-OECD countries.
JEL Classications: F15, F43
Keywords: evolution of comparative advantage, welfare, Ricardian models of trade
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How does technology evolve over time? This question is important in a variety of contexts, most
notably in economic growth and international trade. Much of the economic growth literature
focuses on absolute technological dierences between countries. In the context of the one-sector
model common in this literature, technological progress is unambiguously benecial. Indeed, one
reading of the growth literature is that most of the cross-country income dierences are accounted
for by technology, broadly construed (Klenow and Rodr guez-Clare 1997, Hall and Jones 1999).
By contrast, the Ricardian tradition in international trade emphasizes relative technological
dierences as the reason for international exchange and gains from trade. In the presence of multi-
ple industries and comparative advantage, the welfare consequences of technological improvements
depend crucially on which sectors experience productivity growth. For instance, it is well known
that when productivity growth is biased towards sectors in which a country has a comparative
disadvantage, the country and its trading partners may experience a welfare loss, relative to the
alternative under which growth is balanced across sectors. Plainly, greater relative technology
dierences lead to larger gains from trade, and thus welfare is reduced when countries become
more similar to each other. This result goes back to at least Hicks (1953), and has been reiterated
recently by Samuelson (2004) in the context of productivity growth in developing countries.1
This suggests that in order to fully account for the impact of technological progress on economic
outcomes, we must understand not just the changes in average country-level TFP, but also how
relative technology evolves across sectors. Or, in the vocabulary of international trade, it is
important to know what happens to both absolute and comparative advantage. However, until
now the literature has focused almost exclusively on estimating absolute technology dierences.
In this paper, we examine of the evolution of comparative advantage over time and its welfare
consequences. We rst use a large-scale industry-level dataset on production and bilateral trade,
spanning 75 countries, 19 manufacturing sectors, and 5 decades, to estimate productivity in each
country, sector, and decade, and document the changes in comparative advantage in this set of
countries between the 1960s and today. We then use these estimates in a fully specied Ricardian
model of production and trade to assess the welfare consequences of the patterns seen in the data.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we nd strong evidence that compara-
tive advantage has become weaker. Controlling for the average productivity growth of all sectors
in a country, sectors that were at the greater initial comparative disadvantage grew systematically
faster. This eect is present in all time periods, and is similar in magnitude in both developed
and developing countries. The speed of convergence implied by the estimates is about 25% per
1Other papers that explore technological change in Ricardian models are, among many others, Jones (1979),
Krugman (1979), Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993), and Hymans and Staord (1995).
1decade.
Second, counterfactual exercises reveal that the welfare impact of changes in comparative ad-
vantage is large. We compare welfare in each country during the 2000s to the counterfactual
scenario in which productivity grows at the same country-specic average rate between the 1960s
and the 2000s, but its comparative advantage remains as it was in the 1960s. Because we al-
low average productivity to grow in each country, this exercise reveals the welfare eects of the
evolution of comparative advantage.
For the median country, welfare today is 1.9% lower than it would have been had comparative
advantage remained unchanged since the 1960s. Lower welfare is exactly what theory would
predict, given the empirical result that a typical country's comparative advantage has become
weaker over this period. Indeed, we nd that countries with a more pronounced weakening of
comparative advantage tended to experience a larger welfare loss, and countries whose comparative
advantage strengthened tended to gain in welfare. The median welfare impact corresponds to
roughly 40% of the median gains from trade relative to complete autarky, 4.5%, implied by the
model.
When considered in isolation, the median country thus appears to lose from its own changes
in comparative advantage. In an alternative counterfactual, we evaluate the welfare impact of
technological change in all the countries simultaneously. The median country today has a 1% lower
welfare compared to the counterfactual scenario in which the worldwide comparative advantage
had remained the same as in the 1960s. In addition, it appears that the overall welfare impact of
global changes in comparative advantage is largely driven by what happens in similar countries.
That is, in the sample of OECD countries, overall welfare changes are driven almost exclusively
by comparative advantage changes in the OECD countries. The same is true in the non-OECD
sample: nearly all of the variation in total welfare impact in that group is driven by what happens
to comparative advantage of the non-OECD countries, rather than the OECD.
The basic diculty in measuring sectoral productivity growth in a large sample of countries
and over time is the lack of comparable data on sectoral output and inputs. In addition, estimates
of productivity must take into account each country's participation in exports and imports, both
of the nal output, and of intermediate inputs used in production. In the absence of suciently
detailed input and output price indices, such an exercise would be impractical in a large set of
countries. To overcome this problem, we use the methodology developed by Eaton and Kortum
(2002), and extended to a multi-sector framework by Shikher (2004), Chor (2010), and Costinot
and Komunjer (2008), among many others. This approach uses the structure of the model to
estimate the unobserved productivity parameters within a framework that takes explicit account
of prices and international trade, both in sectoral output, as well as in intermediate inputs. Our
model features many aspects that would be important for estimating underlying technology reli-
2ably: multiple factors of production (labor and capital), a realistic input-output matrix between
the sectors, both inter- and intra-sectoral trade, and a non-traded sector.
We are not the rst to use international trade and production data within the Eaton and
Kortum (2002) framework to estimate technology parameters. Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
Waugh (2009) perform this analysis in a one-sector model at a point in time, an exercise informa-
tive of the cross-section of countries' overall TFP but not their comparative advantage.2 Shikher
(2004, 2005, 2009) obtains technology estimates by sector in the sample of OECD countries, while
Caliendo and Parro (2010) analyze the impact of NAFTA in a multi-sector Eaton-Kortum model.
A recent paper by Hsieh and Ossa (2010) examines the global welfare impact of sector-level pro-
ductivity growth in China between 1993 and 2005, focusing on the uneven growth across sectors.
Relative to existing contributions, we extend the multi-sector approach to a much greater set of
countries, and, most importantly, over time. This allows us, for the rst time, to examine not
just the global cross-section of productivities, but its evolution over the past 5 decades and the
welfare implications of those changes.
Changes in productivity at sector level have received comparatively less attention in the liter-
ature. Bernard and Jones (1996a, 1996b) use production data to study convergence in a sample
of 15 OECD countries and 8 sectors. Proudman and Redding (2000) study the evolution of trade
patterns in the G-5 countries, and nd a great deal of heterogeneity in country experiences. Haus-
mann and Klinger (2007) examine changes in countries' revealed comparative advantage and how
these are related to initial export patterns. Our paper is the rst to use a fully specied model
of production and trade to estimate changes in technology. In addition, we greatly expand the
sample of countries and years relative to these studies.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature that documents the time evolution of diversica-
tion indices, be it of production (e.g. Imbs and Wacziarg 2003), or trade (e.g. Carr ere, Cadot and
Strauss-Kahn 2009). These studies typically nd that countries have a tendency to diversify their
production and exports as they grow, at least until they become quite developed. Our ndings of
weakening comparative advantage are consistent with greater diversication. Unlike diversica-
tion indices, which have no structural interpretation, our approach makes this phenomenon more
precise, by calculating the magnitudes of technology changes that are responsible for the observed
changes in diversication.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical framework.
Section 3 presents the estimation procedure and the data. Section 4 describes the patterns of
2Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2009b) estimate the evolution of overall manufacturing TFP between 1985 and
2002 using a one-sector Eaton and Kortum model.
3Our paper is also related to the literature on international technology diusion, surveyed by Keller (2004).
While we document large and systematic changes in technology over time, our approach is, for now, silent on the
mechanisms behind these changes.
3the evolution of comparative advantage over time, and presents the main econometric results of
the paper on relative convergence. Section 5 examines the welfare implications of the observed
evolution of comparative advantage. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The world is comprised of N countries, indexed by n and i, and J +1 sectors, indexed by j and k.
There are two factors of production, labor (L) and capital (K). Each sector produces a continuum
of goods. The rst J sectors are tradable subject to barriers to trade, and the J + 1-th sector
is nontradable. Both capital and labor are mobile across sectors and immobile across countries.
Trade is balanced each period. We suppress the time index for the ease of notation.
2.1 The Environment






where Yn denotes the nal consumption in country n, and 1
1  denotes the intertemporal rate of
substitution. The budget constraint (or the resource constraint) of the consumer is given by
PnYn = wnLn + rnKn;
where Pn denotes the nal good price, Kn is the exogenous endowment of capital, Ln is the exoge-
nous labor supply, and wn and rn are the wage rate and the rental return of capital, respectively.























where n denotes the Cobb-Douglas weight for the tradable sector composite good,  is the elas-
ticity of substitution between the tradable sectors, !j denotes the weight of each tradable sector
in nal consumption, Y J+1
n is the nontradable-sector composite good, and Y
j
n is the composite
















n is the price of the sector j composite, and Bn = 
 n
n (1   n) (1 n).
4Output in each sector j is produced using a CES production function that aggregates a













where "j denotes the elasticity of substitution across goods in sector j, Q
j
n is the total output of
sector j in country n, and Q
j
n(q) is the amount of variety q that is used in production in sector j










Producing one unit of good q in sector j in country n requires 1
z
j
n(q) input bundles. The cost



















That is, production in sector j requires labor, capital, and a bundle of intermediate inputs, coming
from all sectors k = 1;:::;J + 1. The value-added based labor intensity is given by j, while the
share of value added in total output is given by j. Both of these vary by sector. The weights on
inputs from other sectors, k;j vary by output industry j as well as input industry k.
Productivity z
j
n(q) for each q 2 [0;1] in each sector j is equally available to all agents in country
n, and product and factor markets are perfectly competitive. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002,
henceforth EK), the productivity draw z
j
n(q) is random and comes from the Fr echet distribution






In this distribution, the absolute advantage term T
j
n varies by both country and sector, and the
dispersion parameter j may potentially vary by sector as well.





trade is subject to iceberg costs: in order for one unit of good q produced in sector j to arrive
at country n from country i, d
j
ni > 1 units of the good must be shipped. We normalize d
j
nn = 1
for country n in tradable sector j. Note that the trade costs will vary by destination pair, by
sector, and by time, and in general will not be symmetric: d
j
ni need not equal d
j
in. Under perfect
















Buyers of each good q in tradable sector j in country n will select to buy from the cheapest source


























This value summarizes, for country n, the access to production technologies in sector j. Its value
will be higher if in sector j, country n's trading partners have high productivity (T
j
i ) or low cost
(c
j
i). It will also be higher if the trade costs that country n faces in this sector are low. Standard
steps lead to the familiar result that the probability of importing good q from country i, 
j
ni is











































1 "j , with   the Gamma function.
2.2 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of this model world economy consists of a set of prices, allocation
rules, and trade shares such that (i) given the prices, all rms' inputs satisfy the rst-order con-
ditions, and their output is given by the production function; (ii) given the prices, the consumer's
demand satises the rst-order conditions; (iii) the prices ensure the market clearing conditions
for labor, capital, tradable goods and nontradable goods; (iv) trade shares ensure balanced trade
for each country.




the aggregate price Pn in each country n. The allocation rule includes the capital and labor alloca-





j=1, nal consumption demand fY
j
ngJ+1




6(both nal and intermediate goods) for each sector. The trade shares include the expenditure
share 
j
ni of country n from country i in sector j.
Characterization of Equilibrium




n=1, we rst characterize the optimal allocations from




























n = PnYn = wnLn + rnKn:














n = (1   n)(wnLn + rnKn):
We next characterize the production and factor allocations across the world. Let Q
j
n denote the
total sectoral demand of country n in sector j. Q
j
n is used as nal goods in nal demand and as

















+ (1   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in the non-tradeable sector. In particular, the domestic production value in sector j = 1;2;:::;J




n and (ii) all countries' expen-










, and (iii) expenditure on the j's sector intermediate inputs in the domes-
tic non-traded sector (1   J+1)j;J+1pJ+1
n QJ+1
n . These market clearing conditions summarize
the two important features of the world economy captured by our model: complex international
production linkages, as much of world trade is in intermediate inputs, and a good crosses borders
7multiple times before being consumed (Hummels, Ishii and Yi 2001); and two-way input linkages
between the tradeable and the non-tradeable sectors.
In each tradable sector, some goods q are imported from abroad and some goods q are exported





















n. The total exports of country









balance condition requires that for any country n, EXn   IMn = 0.
We now study the factor allocations across sectors. The total production of tradable sector j








i. The optimal sectoral factor allocations in country n and










































Given all of the model parameters, factor endowments, trade costs, and productivities, the model
is solved using the algorithm described in Appendix A.
3 Estimating Model Parameters
Using data on sectoral production, bilateral sector-level trade, relative prices, GDP, as well as
information on trade barriers, we estimate the technology parameters T
j
i for a large set of countries
in two steps. First, we estimate the technology parameters T
j
i of the tradable sectors for each
country and each sector relative to the U.S.. Second, we estimate the technology parameters for
the U.S., including the nontradable sector, and TJ+1
i for all other countries.
83.1 Tradable Sector Relative Technology
We now focus on the tradable sectors. Following the standard EK approach, rst divide trade


























































































k is an indicator variable for a distance interval (following EK, we set the distance inter-
vals, in miles, to [0, 350], [350, 750], [750, 1500], [1500, 3000], [3000, 6000], [6000, maximum)).
Additional variables are whether the two countries share a common border (b
j
ni), belong to a
currency union (CU
j
ni), or to a regional trade agreement (RTA
j
ni). Following the arguments in
Waugh (2009), we include an exporter xed eect ex
j
i. Finally, there is an error term 
j
ni. Note
that all the variables have a sector superscript j: we allow all the trade cost proxy variables to
aect true iceberg trade costs d
j
ni dierentially across sectors. There is a range of evidence that
trade volumes at sector level vary in their sensitivity to distance or common border (see, among
many others, Do and Levchenko 2007, Berthelon and Freund 2008).














































ni | {z }
Error Term
:
It is clear from this expression that estimating this relationship will yield, for each country,




n) j, which is obtained
by exponentiating the importer xed eect. The available degrees of freedom imply that these




n) j relative to a reference country, which in our estimation




















It is immediate from this expression that estimation delivers a convolution of technology param-
eters T
j
n and cost parameters c
j
n. Both will of course aect trade volumes, but we would like to
extract technology T
j
n from these estimates. In order to do that, we follow the approach of Shikher
(2004). In particular, for each country n, the share of total spending going to home-produced





























































where the subscript us denotes the United States, and thus the ratio of price levels in sector j


























The entire right-hand side of this expression is either observable or estimated. Thus, we can
impute the price levels relative to the U.S. in each country and each tradable sector.






























Using information on relative wages, returns to capital, price in each tradable sector, and the
nontradable sector price relative to the U.S., we can thus impute the costs of the input bundles
relative to the U.S. in each country and each sector. Armed with those values, it is straightforward



















So far we have estimated TFP of the tradable sectors relative to the United States. To complete
our estimation, we still need to nd the TFP levels for the tradable sectors in the United States.
10To do that we use the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database for the U.S. (Bartelsman
and Gray 1996). We also need to estimate the TFP levels of the nontradable sector for all sample
countries. The information we will use is the sectoral nal demand in each country in the sample.
We start by measuring the observed TFP levels for the tradable sectors in the U.S.. The form
of the production function gives
lnY j
us = lnj
us + jj lnLj
us + j(1   j)lnKj





where j denotes the measured TFP in sector j, Y j denotes the output, Lj denotes the labor
input, Kj denotes the capital input, and Mk;j denotes the intermediate input from sector k. The
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database oers information on output, labor input, capital
input, and intermediate good input. Thus, we can estimate the observed TFP level for each
manufacturing tradable sector using the above equation.







j . In the open economies, the goods with inecient domestic productivity draws
will not be produced and will be imported instead. Thus, international trade and competition
introduce selection in the observed TFP level, as demonstrated by Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia
(2009a). We use our model to back out the true TFP level of each tradable sector in the United





























































This equation can be solved for underlying technology parameters T
j
us in the U.S., given estimated
observed TFP 
j




us;i's estimated in the previous subsection.
We next estimate the preference shares f!jgJ




1. Start with a guess of fp
j
ngJ
j=1 for all country n.








1  for all n.
3. Compute pJ+1
n using the data on the ratio of the relative nontradable price for all n.













j and repeat the above procedures until the prices converge.















; for any j = f1;::;Jg:
We normalize the vector of ! to have a sum of one. Repeat the above procedures until the sectoral
preference shares converge.
We then estimate the nontradable sector TFP using the relative prices. In the model, the







Since we know pT
n, cJ+1
n , and the relative price of nontradables (which we take from the data), we
can back out TJ+1
n 8n from the equation above.
3.3 Data Description and Implementation
In order to carry out estimation, we assemble data on production and trade for a sample of
up to 75 countries, 19 manufacturing sectors, and spanning 5 decades, from the 1960s to the
2000s. Production data come from the 2009 UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database, which reports
output, value added, employment, and wage bills at roughly 2-digit ISIC Revision 3 level of
disaggregation for the period 1962-2007 in the best of cases. The corresponding trade data comes
from the COMTRADE database compiled by the UN. The trade data are collected at the 4-
digit SITC level, and aggregated up to the 2-digit ISIC level using a concordance developed by
the authors. Production and trade data were extensively checked for quality, and a number of
countries were discarded due to poor data quality. In addition, in less than 5% of country-year-
sector observations, the reported total output was below total exports, and thus had to be imputed
based on earlier values and the evolution of exports. Appendix Table A1 lists the countries used
in the analysis along with the time periods for which data are available for each country, and
Appendix Table A2 lists the sectors.
The distance and common border variables were obtained from the comprehensive geography
database compiled by CEPII. Information on regional trade agreements comes from the RTA
database maintained by the WTO. The currency union indicator comes from Rose (2004), and
was updated for the post-2000 period using publicly available information (such as the membership
in the Euro area, and the dollarization of Ecuador and El Salvador).
12In addition to providing data on output for gravity estimation, the UNIDO data were used to
estimate production function parameters j and j. To compute j for each sector, we calculated
the share of the total wage bill in value added, and took a simple median across countries (taking
the mean yields essentially the same results). To compute intermediate input intensity, j, we
took the median of value added divided by total output.
The intermediate input coecients k;j are obtained from the Direct Requirements Table
for the United States. We use the 1997 Benchmark Detailed Make and Use Tables (covering
approximately 500 distinct sectors), as well as a concordance to the ISIC Revision 3 classication
to build a Direct Requirements Table at the 2-digit ISIC level. The Direct Requirements Table
gives the value of the intermediate input in row k required to produce one dollar of nal output in
column j. Thus, it is the direct counterpart of of the input coecients k;j. Note that we assume
these to be the same in all countries. di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) provide suggestive
evidence that at such a coarse level of aggregation, Input-Output matrices are indeed similar
across countries. In addition, we use the U.S. I-O matrix to obtain the shares of total nal
consumption expenditure going to each sector, which we use to pin down taste parameters !j
in traded sectors 1;:::;J; as well as J+1 and J+1 in the non-tradeable sector, which cannot be
obtained from UNIDO.4
The computation of relative costs of the input bundle requires information on wages and the
returns to capital. To compute wages, we divided the total manufacturing sector wage bill by total
manufacturing employment in each country, and took that value relative to the U.S.. Consistent
with the model, this procedure delivers wages that dier by country but not by sector.5
Obtaining information on the return to capital, rn, is less straightforward, since it is not
observable directly. In the baseline analysis, we assume that the wage-rental ratio is determined







where  is the aggregate share of labor in GDP, which we set to 2/3.6
4The U.S. I-O matrix provides an alternative way of computing 
j and 
j. These parameters calculated based
on the U.S. I-O table are very similar to those obtained from UNIDO, with the correlation coecients between
them above 0.85 in each case. The U.S. I-O table implies greater variability in 
j's and 
j's across sectors than
does UNIDO.
5In less than 1% of country-decade observations, either the total wage bill or employment were missing from the
UNIDO data. In those cases, the wage relative to the U.S. was proxied by the GDP per capita relative to the U.S.
6The return to capital will be aected by country characteristics other than capital abundance, such as the
quality of the country's regulatory environment, corruption, and expropriation risk, among other factors. Indeed,
Caselli and Feyrer (2007) document that the marginal product of capital is remarkably similar across a wide range
countries. Alternatively, the return to capital will be the same in all countries under international capital mobility.
None of the results below are aected if we assume instead that the return to capital, rn, does not dier across
countries.
13The price of non-tradeables relative to the U.S., pJ+1
n =pJ+1
us , and the price of non-tradeables
relative to tradeables in each country, pJ+1
n =pT
n, are computed using the detailed price data col-
lected by the International Comparison of Prices Program (ICP). For a few countries and decades,
these relative prices were extrapolated using a simple linear t to log PPP-adjusted per capita
GDP from the Penn World Tables 6.3 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002).
The total labor force in each country, Ln, and the total capital stock, Kn, are obtained from
the Penn World Tables 6.3. Following the standard approach in the literature (see, e.g. Hall and
Jones 1999, Bernanke and Gurkaynak 2001, Caselli 2005), the total labor force is calculated from
the data on the total GDP per capita and per worker.7 The total capital is calculated using the
perpetual inventory method that assumes a depreciation rate of 6%: Kn;t = (1 0:06)Kn;t 1+In;t,
where In;t is total investment in country n in period t. For most countries, investment data start
in 1950, and the initial value of Kn is set equal to In;0=( + 0:06), where  is the average growth
rate of investment in the rst 10 years for which data are available.
In order to estimate the relative TFP's in the tradedable sectors in the U.S., we use the 2009
version of the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, that reports the total output, total
input usage, employment, and capital stock, along with deators for each of these in each sector.
The data are available in the 6-digit NAICS classication for the period 1958 to 2005, and are
converted into ISIC 2-digit sectors using a concordance developed by the authors. The procedure
yields sectoral TFP's for the U.S. in each tradeable sector j = 1;:::;J and each decade.
The share of expenditure on traded goods, n in each country and decade is sourced from
Yi and Zhang (2010), who compile this information for 30 developed and developing countries.
For countries unavailable in the Yi and Zhang data, values of n were imputed based on tting a
simple linear relationship to log PPP-adjusted per capita GDP from the Penn World Tables. In
each decade, the t of this simple linear relationship was typically quite good, with R2's of 0.30
to 0.80 across decades.
Finally, for now we assume that the dispersion parameter j does not vary across sectors.
There are no reliable estimates of how it varies across sectors, and thus we do not model this
variation. We pick the value of  = 8:28, which is the preferred estimate of EK.8 We choose the
elasticity of substitution between broad sectors within the tradeable bundle, , to be equal to 2.
Since these are very large product categories, it is sensible that this elasticity would be relatively
7Using the variable name conventions in the Penn World Tables, Ln = 1000  pop  rgdpch=rgdpwok.
8Shikher (2004, 2005, 2009), Burstein and Vogel (2009), and Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2010), among
others, follow the same approach of assuming the same  across sectors. Caliendo and Parro (2010) use tari data
and triple dierencing to estimate sector-level . However, their approach may impose too much structure and/or
be dominated by measurement error: at times the values of  they estimate are negative. In addition, in each sector
the restriction that  > "   1 must be satised, and it is not clear whether Caliendo and Parro (2010)'s estimated
sectoral 's meet this restriction in every case. Our approach is thus conservative by being agnostic on this variation
across sectors.
14low. It is higher, however, than the elasticity of substitution between tradeable and non-tradeable
goods, which is set to 1 by the Cobb-Douglas assumption. The elasticity of substitution between
varieties within each tradeable sector, "j, is set to 4.
All of the variables that vary over time are averaged for each decade, from the 1960s to the
2000s, and these decennial averages are used in the analysis throughout. Thus, our unit of time
is a decade.
4 Evolution of Comparative Advantage
In this section, we describe the basic patterns in how estimated sector-level technology varies
across countries and over time, focusing especially on whether comparative advantage has become
stronger or weaker. Going through the steps described in Section 3.1 yields, for each country n,





choice of the U.S. as the reference country is arbitrary, we present the stylized facts based not
on each country's dierence with respect to the U.S., but with respect to the global frontier. In




us, take their geometric mean, and
label that the global frontier. We then re-normalize each country's technology parameter to be
expressed relative to the frontier, rather than the U.S.. In addition, since mean productivity in
each sector is equal to T1=, we carry out the analysis on this value, rather than T.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the OECD and non-OECD countries in each decade.
The rst column reports the mean distance to the frontier across all sectors in a country, a
measure that can be thought of as absolute advantage. Not surprisingly, the OECD countries
as a group catch up to the frontier between the 1960s and the 2000s, with productivities going
up from 0.65 to 0.84 of the frontier value. The non-OECD countries' position shows no clear
upward or downward pattern. The second column in each panel summarizes the magnitude of
within-country dierences in productivity across sectors. Namely, it reports the mean ratio of
productivities in the two most productive sectors relative to the two least productive ones, by
country group and decade. This measure can be thought of as comparative advantage across
sectors. For the OECD, this measure is on the order of 1.4 1.5, and decreasing monotonically
over time. For the non-OECD countries, it uctuates around 2, showing no clear trend. Not
surprisingly, the non-OECD countries tend to have stronger comparative advantage.
The evolution of these averages over time masks a great deal of heterogeneity among countries.
Table 2 reports top 10 and bottom 10 countries ranked according to how fast their average
productivity changed relative to the frontier. The left panel presents the changes from the 1960s
to 2000s, and the right panel from the 1980s to 2000s. Over the period 1960s-2000s, the countries
that caught up to the frontier the fastest are for the most part peripheral OECD countries, such
15as Norway, Portugal, and Greece. Countries slowest to catch up (or fastest to fall behind) are
developing countries, that surprisingly include two of the more successful East Asian economies,
Thailand and Malaysia. This is of course not inconsistent with high rate of economic growth
experienced by these countries. First, these are measures of average technology, and part of the
growth in those countries would have been driven by factor accumulation. More importantly, these
are measures of distance to the technological frontier. Thus, even if these countries experienced
overall productivity growth, our procedure shows that the frontier grew even faster. Since the
1980s, the composition of countries changes somewhat, but the patterns are broadly similar.
In addition to absolute advantage, we can assess how the countries comparative advantage
evolved. Table 3 reports the top 10 and bottom 10 countries in how much the dispersion in
the country's technology across sectors changed. In particular, for each country and decade, we
compute the coecient of variation in T1= across sectors, and record how much this coecient
of variation changed over time. Thus, larger negative changes imply greater reductions in pro-
ductivity dispersion across sectors, and thus greater relative catch-up. Conversely, positive values
imply that a country's comparative advantage has gotten stronger, as its productivity dispersion
increased.
It is clear from comparing Tables 2 and 3 that absolute and relative convergence are closely
related: most of the fastest converging countries on average are also those that catch up dispro-
portionately in their weakest sectors. This can be due in part to the fact that the best sectors in
those countries are already at the frontier, thus the only sectors that can catch up are the weak
ones. However, the rankings are very similar if we instead do not normalize by the frontier, and
assess the changes relative to the reference country. This way, there is no mechanical ceiling for a
country's strongest sectors. Less obviously, the bottom countries tend to be similar as well. Thus,
countries that fell behind the most on average also tend to experience greater dispersion across
sectors: their weakest sectors fall disproportionately more than their strongest ones. Figure 1
presents the correlation between relative and absolute convergence graphically. There is a strong
association between these two measures.
Table 4 reports the correlation coecients between absolute and relative convergence mea-
sures, and the corresponding changes in real PPP-adjusted per capita income and overall trade
openness, sourced from the Penn World Tables. In addition to the high positive correlation (0.61-
0.64) between our two measures, the table reveals that neither is particularly strongly correlated
with changes in income or openness. There is a positive correlation (around 0.25) between income
growth and average convergence, the correlation with relative convergence is close to zero and
mildly negative. Growth in trade openness is actually negatively correlated with average conver-
gence, and virtually uncorrelated with relative convergence. Figure 2 presents the scatterplots of
absolute and relative convergence against income growth and openness.
16The summary statistics so far reveal a great deal of variation in how countries' absolute and
comparative advantage evolved between the 1960s and today. To shed further light on whether
comparative advantage has gotten stronger or weaker over time, we estimate a convergence spec-











+ n + j + nj (1)
Unlike the classic cross-country convergence regression, our specication pools countries and sec-
tors. On the left-hand side is the log change in the productivity of sector j in country n. The
right-hand side regressor of interest is its beginning-of-period value. All of the specications in-
clude country and sector eects, which aects the interpretation of the coecient. The country
eect captures the average change in productivity across all sectors in each country { the absolute
advantage. Thus,  picks up the impact of the initial relative productivity on the relative growth
of a sector within a country { the evolution of comparative advantage. In particular, a negative
value of  implies that relative to the country-specic average, the most backward sectors grew
fastest.
Table 5 reports the results. The rst column reports the coecients for the longest dierences:
the 1960s to the 2000s, while the second column estimates the specication starting in the 1980s.
The following 4 columns carry out the estimation decade-by-decade, 1960s to 1970s, 1970s to
1980s, and so on. Since the length of the time period diers across columns, the coecients
are not directly comparable. To help interpret the coecients, underneath each one we report
the speed of convergence, calculated according to the standard Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)
formula:  = 1 eT
T , where  is the regression coecient on the initial value of productivity, T
is the number of years between the initial and nal period, and  is the convergence speed. This
number gives how much of the initial dierence between productivities is expected to disappear
in a decade. All of the standard errors are clustered by country, to account for unspecied
heteroscedasticity at the country level. All of the results are robust to clustering instead at the
sector level, and we do not report those standard errors to conserve space.
Column 1 of the top panel reports the estimates for the long-run convergence in the pooled
sample of all countries. The coecient is negative, implying that there is convergence: within a
country, the weakest sectors tend to grow faster. It is highly statistically signicant: even with
clustering the t statistic is over 13. The speed of convergence implied by this coecient is 24%
per decade. As a benchmark, the classic Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) rate of convergence
is 2% per year, or 22% per decade, strikingly close to what we nd in a very dierent setting.
The second column estimates the long-dierence specication from the 1980s to the 2000s. Once
again, the coecient is negative and highly signicant, but it implies a considerably slower rate
17of convergence, 12.4% per decade. The rest of the columns report the results decade-by-decade.
Though there is statistically signicant convergence in each decade, it is striking that the speed
of convergence trends downward, from nearly 30% from the 1960 to the 1970s, to 16.5% in the
most recent period.
In order to assess how the results dier across country groups, Panels B and C report the
results for the OECD and the non-OECD subsamples separately. (Note that we do not recalculate
subsample-specic frontier productivities, so the frontier is the same across subsamples.) Breaking
it down produces slightly faster convergence rates than in the full sample. With the exception of
the 1980s to the 2000s long dierence, the non-OECD countries are catching up somewhat faster,
which is not surprising.
Appendix Tables A3 and A4 report the results of estimating the convergence equation (1)
country by country, for the periods starting in the 1960s and the 1980s, respectively. These
results should be treated with more caution, as the sample size is at most 19. The columns report
the coecient, the standard error, the number of observations, the R2, as well as the implied
speed of convergence for each country. Starting in the 1960s, there is considerable evidence of
convergence in these country-specic estimates. In all countries, the convergence coecient is
negative, and signicant at the 10% level or below in 39 out of 51 available countries (76%). The
evidence starting in the 1980s is weaker: though the large majority of the coecients are still
negative, only 25 out of 61 countries (41%) are showing statistical signicance. In addition, most
of the countries with a signicant coecient are actually the OECD. Thus, consistent with the
pooled results that show a slowdown in convergence starting in the 1980s, these results are less
striking than those starting in the 1960s.
All in all, our results provide remarkably robust evidence of relative convergence: in all time
periods and broad sets of countries we consider, relatively weak sectors grow faster, with sensible
rates of convergence. This implies that Ricardian comparative advantage is getting weaker, at
least when measured at the level of broad manufacturing sectors.
5 Welfare Analysis
This section computes the welfare impact of changes in comparative advantage documented in
the previous section. In order to do this, we solve the full model laid out in Section 2 for a variety
of values of technology parameters. The baseline corresponds to the actual values of T
j
n estimated
for the 2000s. Before running the counterfactual experiments, we assess the t of the baseline
model in a number of dimensions. The values of technology parameters are estimated based on
the gravity relationship in sectoral trade ows and actual factor endowments, thus the model ts
bilateral sector-level trade ows as well as the least-squares gravity relationship can deliver. A
18more important question is whether the levels of factor prices { w and r { implied by the model
are close to the values from the data used in calculating technology parameters. Table 6 compares
w's and r's in the model and in the data for 2000s.9 It is clear that the two are very close: the
means and the medians match up quite well, and the correlation between model and data wages
is 0.987. The correlation in r's is slightly lower, but still quite high at 0.918.
Another metric by which to evaluate the model is overall trade ows. Though the model is
based on matching bilateral sector-level trade ows, it may be that aggregating across dierent
sectors and adding a non-tradeable sector leads to biases when it comes to overall trade openness.
The bottom panel compares manufacturing imports as a share of GDP in the model to the data.10
We can see that the averages are extremely close, with both means and medians in the model
and the data at roughly 20-22%. The correlation is not perfect, but very high at 0.74. Figure 3
presents the comparision of the three variables between the model and the data graphically.
The rst counterfactual assumes that between the 1960s and today, each country's T's relative
to the world frontier grew at their geometric average rate, but their comparative advantage








































F is the world frontier in sector j, calculated as in Section 4. The use of geometric averages
has two appealing features. The rst is that even though the counterfactual T's are calculated
to keep their distance to the frontier, the geometric average of counterfactual T's is equal to the
geometric average of the country's actual T's in the 2000s. This ensures that the normalization
to the frontier does not induce movements up or down of the average productivity in the country,
which would confound the meaning of our counterfactual exercise. The second appealing feature
is that this formulation produces identical counterfactual T's whether the experiment is carried
out on absolute T's or T1='s, which are the mean productivities.11
We begin by evaluating the impact of each country's changes in comparative advantage on
its own welfare in isolation. In order to do this, we solve the model while keeping comparative
advantage xed to the 1960s for one country at a time, and record the change in welfare for that
country in the counterfactual relative to the baseline. Table 7 summarizes the results, separating
the OECD and the non-OECD countries. The table reports the percentage changes in welfare,
9Comparisons based on earlier decades deliver nearly identical results.
10The data on manufacturing imports as a share of GDP come from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators.
11We keep productivity in the nontradeable sector at the benchmark value in all the counterfactual experiments,
since our focus is on the welfare impact of changes in comparative advantage.
19for the counterfactual relative to the benchmark. Thus, the positive median values in the rst
column indicate that on average, welfare would have been higher had comparative advantage not
changed since the 1960s. This accords well with what is predicted by theory, given the pronounced
weakening of comparative advantage we found in the data in Section 4. However, now we can
quantify these eects: for the median OECD country, welfare would have been 1.7% higher had
its comparative advantage not weakened. For the non-OECD, the impact very similar, 1.9% at
the median.
The second notable aspect of the results is the large dispersion. Among the OECD countries,
the standard deviation of welfare changes is 1.8%, while for the non-OECD, it is 2.5 times higher,
5.5%. Correspondingly, the OECD changes range from -0.5% to 5.6%, while for the non-OECD,
the range is from  9.3% to 27%. Importantly, among the non-OECD countries, welfare changes
range from large negative to large positive, indicating that heterogeneity across countries is rst-
order.
To cross-check these results and compare magnitudes, the bottom panel of Table 7 reports the
same summary statistics for the overall gains from trade compared to autarky for the 2000s in the
baseline model. It appears that the welfare impact of the evolution of comparative advantage is
on average of the same order of magnitude as the total gains from trade. For the median OECD
country, the median gains from trade are 5.2%, while for the non-OECD countries, the median
total gains from trade are 4.4%. In addition, there are important dierences in the extent of
variation of welfare gains from trade compared to welfare changes due to technological changes.
In both groups of countries, the gains from trade have a standard deviation of about 3% and
a range of about 11%: from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 12%. For the OECD countries,
the range of welfare changes due to technology is much smaller, with a standard deviation of less
than 2%, and a range of 6 percentage points. However, for the non-OECD countries, technology
changes matter much more: they have a standard deviation of 5.5%, and a range of nearly 40
percentage points. In addition, while gains from trade are { of course { always positive, the
welfare impact of technological changes takes on both positive and negative values.
How can we make sense of such a wide variation? Theory predicts that on average, coun-
tries experiencing a weakening in comparative advantage should see a reduction in welfare, and
countries with a strengthening comparative advantage should be better o. We can verify this by
correlating the welfare change implied by the counterfactual exercise to our empirical measures
of weakening/strengthening of comparative advantage. Figure 4 presents the results. It plots the
change in welfare in the counterfactual relative to the benchmark against the percentage change
in the coecient of variation in a country's T1='s calculated in the previous section. An fall in
the coecient of variation implies that dispersion across sectoral productivities decreased in a
country over time { a weakening of comparative advantage. We should expect these countries to
20on average have higher welfare in the counterfactual that instead xes comparative advantage to
its initial value. Figure 4 conrms this conjecture: there is a pronounced negative relationship
between these two variables, with a correlation of -0.5.12
The preceding counterfactual describes the impact of changes in comparative advantage in an
individual country on welfare in the country itself. Consistent with the simple intuition gleaned
from theory, our empirical nding of weakening comparative advantage also implies that on av-
erage, a country would have been better o keeping its 1960s comparative advantage, given the
technological change actually observed elsewhere in the world. A complementary, and equally in-
teresting question is what would have happened to all countries had comparative advantage been
stuck in the 1960s in every country in the world. Panel A of Table 8 reports the welfare results of
this counterfactual. It summarizes the percentage change in welfare that would have resulted had
the entire world kept its comparative advantage the same as in the 1960s. Once again, a positive
number means that welfare is higher in the counterfactual relative to the benchmark: in this case
a country is better o living in the counterfactual world.
On average, while we still nd that countries are worse o, these welfare losses are smaller
than those in the previous counterfactual, in which only one country's comparative advantage
was xed at the 1960s. The median welfare loss to the OECD is 1.2%, and for the non-OECD
0.6%. The range of outcomes is similar, however. For the non-OECD countries, welfare in the
counterfactual ranges from a 9.7% gain to a 22.3% loss. For the OECD, the range of outcomes
narrows somewhat.
The preceding two sets of results point to the rst-order role of trading partners' evolution
of comparative advantage for each country's welfare: the welfare loss from technological change
is smaller if everyone's technology is evolving, compared to the case in which only one country
is changing its comparative advantage. In the next exercise, we sort out which types of trading
partners turn out to be most important for a country's welfare. For instance, it is often suggested
that changes in comparative advantage in developing countries can reduce welfare in developed
ones (see Samuelson 2004, for a recent example). In order to evaluate this claim, we break up the
overall welfare eect into two large groups: that driven by technology changes in the OECD, and
in the non-OECD. To do this, we run two additional counterfactual exercises: in the rst, we keep
the comparative advantage in the OECD countries xed as in the 1960s, and let the non-OECD
countries' comparative advantage evolve as it did in the data. This exercise reveals the welfare
changes in all of the countries in the world that are due to the evolution of comparative advantage
in the OECD only. In the second counterfactual, we keep the non-OECD comparative advantage
xed to the 1960s instead, and let the OECD technology evolve as it did in the data.
Panels B and C of Table 8 report the results. Once again, a positive number means that
12This correlation is virtually unchanged if outlier Indonesia is excluded.
21the country is worse o under the counterfactual compared to the benchmark, that is, the actual
observed changes in comparative advantage decreased welfare. The patterns are striking: observed
changes in OECD comparative advantage tended to hurt the OECD countries, but had virtually
no eect on the non-OECD countries. The median impact of OECD technological change on the
non-OECD countries is 0.0%, and the range is also tiny, from -0.5% to 0.7%. The same is true
of the non-OECD technical change: it tended to lower welfare within that group, and and had
virtually no impact on the OECD.
Figure 5(a) plots for the OECD countries the welfare changes implied by the evolution of
comparative advantage in the OECD only on the y-axis against the total welfare changes from
the evolution of comparative advantage in the entire world. Figure 5(b) plots instead the changes
in welfare in the OECD due to the non-OECD countries' evolution of comparative advantage. For
ease of interpretation, we add a 45-degree line to both plots. The results are striking. Virtually
all of the total welfare change in the OECD is driven by changes in comparative advantage in
the OECD itself, as shown in Figure 5(a). By contrast, the non-OECD impact on the OECD is
virtually zero for almost all countries. These results imply that while it is true that changes in
comparative advantage can lower welfare, for the OECD welfare is driven almost exclusively by
what happens within that group of countries.
These results could be driven in part by the fact that the trade between the OECD countries
accounts for majority of world trade, and thus the OECD countries are almost always each others'
largest trading partners. Figure 6 repeats the exercise for the non-OECD country group. In 6(a),
we plot the welfare change in the non-OECD that is due to the OECD comparative advantage
changes against the total welfare change. In 6(b), we instead plot the welfare change due to the
non-OECD changes. The results are remarkable: among the non-OECD countries, most welfare
changes are driven by the non-OECD comparative advantage changes. This result cannot be
explained by the preponderance of trade in this group of countries, since the non-OECD-non-
OECD trade is the smallest category of world trade, much lower than the OECD-non-OECD
trade. For these results, multilateral eects are clearly important.
5.1 Changes in Comparative Advantage and Trade Volumes
A related aspect of weakening comparative advantage is its impact on trade volumes. Intuition
based on simple theory tells us that when comparative advantage weakens, trade volumes should
decrease. We conrm this in Table 9. It reports the absolute change in the ratio of imports
to GDP in the counterfactual compared to the benchmark. Panel A reports the results for the
change in the imports/GDP ratio under the rst counterfactual, in which only one country's
comparative advantage is kept xed to the 1960s, while all other countries' sectoral productivities
22are the same as estimated in the data. For the OECD countries, imports are 1.9 percentage
points of GDP higher in the counterfactual compared to the baseline, a proportional increase of
about 10% relative to what is observed in the data. For the non-OECD countries, the change is
even larger, 4.2 percentage points of GDP, or about a 20% change in trade openness compared to
the baseline. Panel B of Table 9 reports the results for the second counterfactual, in which the
worldwide relative technology is xed to the 1960s. Here, the increase is slightly more subdued, 1.8
percentage points of GDP for the OECD, and 2.6 percentage points of GDP for the non-OECD.
6 Conclusion
How does technology evolve over time, and what are the consequences of technological change?
In the growth literature, it is widely recognized that economic growth is driven in large part by
productivity growth, making it the key force for improvements in welfare. However, when relative
technology dierences are a source of international trade as in the Ricardian world, the welfare
impact of technological progress depends on which sectors grow in which countries.
This paper starts by estimating comparative advantage in a sample of some 75 countries, 19
sectors, and 5 decades, 1960s to today. We document a striking pattern in the data: in the
world as a whole, comparative advantage is getting weaker over time. This eect is present in all
time periods and major country groups: within a country, sectors with the lowest initial relative
productivity experience systematically faster productivity growth than sectors with highest initial
productivity. This empirical nding opens the door to the theoretical possibility that this type of
uneven technological progress can actually reduce welfare in the trading countries. Calibrating the
model and solving for the counterfactual scenario in which comparative advantage is instead xed
at its initial-period values, we indeed nd that welfare was reduced by weakening comparative
advantage. The average impact is large, roughly the same order of magnitude as the total gains
from trade for these countries in the 2000s.
In developed countries, the typical worry is that rapid technological catch-up in developing
world can lower welfare through this channel. However, we nd that nearly all of the welfare
impact for the OECD countries comes from changes in comparative advantage within the OECD.
Thus, while the negative welfare impact of uneven technological change is very much a feature
of the data, for developed countries the culprit is not the poor countries, but rather the rich
countries themselves.
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28Table 1. Summary Statistics
OECD Non-OECD
Mean Top2/bottom2 Countries Mean Top2/bottom2 Countries
T1= T1= T1= T1=
1960s 0.651 1.502 21 0.453 2.066 33
1970s 0.692 1.434 21 0.471 1.775 37
1980s 0.776 1.412 22 0.509 1.922 42
1990s 0.808 1.395 22 0.378 2.136 53
2000s 0.838 1.394 22 0.410 2.088 53
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the average productivity relative to the frontier (mean
T
1=), the relative productivity of the two most productive tradeable sectors relative to the 2 least productive
ones (top2/bottom2 T
1=), as well as the number of countries for which data are available. The samples are
split by decade and into OECD and non-OECD groups.
29Table 2. Average Convergence: Fastest and Slowest Countries
Since 1960s Since 1980s
Top 10: Fastest Converging Countries Top 10: Fastest Converging Countries
Iceland 0.618 Portugal 0.373
Norway 0.615 Greece 0.364
Korea, Rep. 0.566 Ireland 0.315
Ireland 0.525 Norway 0.258
Netherlands 0.449 Iceland 0.240
Finland 0.445 Korea, Rep. 0.240
Israel 0.384 Belgium-Luxembourg 0.182
Greece 0.382 Mauritius 0.162
Portugal 0.347 United Kingdom 0.159
Germany 0.337 Finland 0.138
Bottom 10: Slowest Converging Countries Bottom 10: Slowest Converging Countries
Malaysia -0.163 Senegal -0.226
Philippines -0.166 Argentina -0.236
Canada -0.183 Brazil -0.237
Turkey -0.259 Peru -0.270
Thailand -0.271 India -0.332
Venezuela, RB -0.276 Iran, Islamic Rep. -0.348
Honduras -0.337 Venezuela, RB -0.366
India -0.358 Ethiopia -0.395
Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.372 Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.405
Sri Lanka -0.419 Honduras -0.428
Notes: This table reports the 10 fastest and 10 slowest converging countries since the 1960s (left panel) and
the 1980s (right panel), measured by the percent change in the mean absolute distance to the frontier across
all tradeable sectors.
30Table 3. Relative Convergence: Fastest and Slowest Countries
Since 1960s Since 1980s
Top 10: Fastest Converging Countries Top 10: Fastest Converging Countries
Norway -0.654 Norway -0.534
Indonesia -0.396 Sweden -0.379
Finland -0.379 Greece -0.264
Sweden -0.343 Denmark -0.231
Spain -0.333 Iceland -0.199
Korea, Rep. -0.327 Finland -0.185
Denmark -0.299 Spain -0.172
Belgium-Luxembourg -0.290 Chile -0.142
Iceland -0.286 Germany -0.133
Ireland -0.271 Costa Rica -0.111
Bottom 10: Slowest Converging Countries Bottom 10: Slowest Converging Countries
India 0.132 Trinidad and Tobago 0.301
Kenya 0.154 Saudi Arabia 0.308
Honduras 0.185 Italy 0.317
Thailand 0.260 El Salvador 0.352
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.300 Canada 0.352
South Africa 0.315 Australia 0.419
Ghana 0.353 Venezuela, RB 0.584
Japan 0.448 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.761
Canada 0.485 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.785
Sri Lanka 0.744 Japan 0.880
Notes: This table reports the 10 fastest and 10 slowest converging countries since the 1960s (left panel)
and the 1980s (right panel), measured by the percent change in the coecient of variation across tradeable







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: This table reports the means and medians of imports as a share of GDP, wages relative to the
U.S. (middle panel) and return to capital relative to the U.S., in the model and in the data. In the data,
Imports/GDP are the manufacturing imports as a share of GDP in the 2000s, sourced from the World
Bank's World Development Indicators. Wages and return to capital in the data are calculated as described
in detail in the main text.
Table 7. Welfare in the Single-Country Counterfactual Relative to Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Median St. Dev. Min Max Countries
Welfare gains in the counterfactual relative to baseline
OECD 0.017 0.018 -0.005 0.056 22
Non-OECD 0.019 0.055 -0.093 0.270 53
NB: Overall gains from trade
OECD 0.052 0.032 0.011 0.120
Non-OECD 0.044 0.029 0.005 0.122
Notes: This table reports the percentage change in welfare under the counterfactual scenario with respect to
the baseline. The counterfactual assumes that for each individual country, comparative advantage remained
as it was in the 1960s, while its T's grew at the same country-specic average rate between the 1960s and
the 2000s. All other countries' comparative advantage is taken from the data. In the baseline comparative
advantage is as it is in the data for the 2000s. The lower panel reports the total gains from trade relative to
autarky in the baseline for the 2000s
34Table 8. Welfare in the Global Counterfactual Relative to Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Median St. Dev. Min Max Countries
Welfare gains in the counterfactual relative to baseline
Panel A: CA xed to 1960s in all countries
OECD 0.012 0.013 -0.008 0.038 22
Non-OECD 0.006 0.050 -0.097 0.223 53
Panel B: CA xed to 1960s in OECD countries only
OECD 0.013 0.014 -0.008 0.041
Non-OECD 0.000 0.002 -0.005 0.007
Panel C: CA xed to 1960s in non-OECD countries only
OECD 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.006
Non-OECD 0.013 0.054 -0.097 0.257
Notes: This table reports the percentage change in welfare under the counterfactual scenario with respect to
the baseline. The counterfactual assumes that in all countries in the world (Panel A), in OECD (Panel B)
and the non-OECD (Panel C), comparative advantage remained as it was in the 1960s, while its T's grew
at the same country-specic average rate between the 1960s and the 2000s. In the baseline comparative
advantage is as it is in the data for the 2000s.
Table 9. Trade Volumes in the Counterfactuals Relative to Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Median St. Dev. Min Max Countries
Absolute change in imports/GDP
in the counterfactual relative to baseline
Panel A: Country-by-country counterfactual
OECD 0.019 0.039 -0.008 0.128 22
Non-OECD 0.042 0.079 -0.070 0.430 53
Panel B: Global counterfactual
OECD 0.018 0.015 -0.004 0.048
Non-OECD 0.026 0.039 -0.042 0.169
Notes: This table reports the absolute change in imports/GDP under the counterfactual scenarios with
respect to the baseline. In Panel A, the counterfactual scenario assumes that a single country's comparative
advantage is the same as in the 1960s, and evaluates the impact of this change for that country's trade
volumes. In Panel B, the counterfactual scenario assumes that comparative advantage is xed to the 1960s
in every country in the world, and reports the summary statistics for the change in trade volumes in this
sample of countries.
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Notes: This gure displays the percentage change in a country's average distance to the world frontier
(horizontal axis) against the percentage change in the coecient of variation in distances to frontier across
sectors (vertical axis), along with the least squares t through the data.
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(d) Relative Convergence and Trade Growth
Notes: This gure presents the bivariate plots of absolute (top row) and relative convergence (bottom row),
against convemporaneous changes in PPP-adjusted real per capita GDP and changes in trade openness
(Imports + Exports)/GDP.
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0 .2 .4 .6
Data: Manufacturing Imports/GDP
(c) Imports/GDP
Notes: This gure presents the scatterplots of wages, return to capital, and manufacturing imports/GDP,
for the model (y-axis) against the data (x-axis).
38Figure 4. Welfare Changes and Relative Convergence
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Notes: This gure displays the percentage change in a country's welfare in the counterfactual scenario in
which its comparative advantage was xed at its 1960s value relative to the baseline (y-axis), against the
change in the coecient of variation in the country's T
1= between the 1960s and the 2000s (x-axis). A
larger value of the x-axis variable implies that comparative advantage has gotten stronger. A negative value
implies that comparative advantage has gotten weaker.
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Total Change in Welfare
(b) Accounted for by non-OECD
Notes: This gure plots, for the OECD countries, the total welfare change in the counterfactual on the
x-axis against the welfare change due to comparative advantage changes in the OECD only (top panel), and
the non-OECD only (bottom panel). The straight line is the 45-degree line.
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Total Change in Welfare
(b) Accounted for by non-OECD
Notes: This gure plots, for the non-OECD countries, the total welfare change in the counterfactual on the
x-axis against the welfare change due to comparative advantage changes in the OECD only (top panel), and
the non-OECD only (bottom panel). The straight line is the 45-degree line.
41Table A1. Country Coverage
Country Period Country Period
OECD Non-OECD
Australia 1960s 2000s Argentina 1980s 2000s
Austria 1960s 2000s Bangladesh 1970s 2000s
Belgium-Luxembourg 1960s 2000s Bolivia 1960s 2000s
Canada 1960s 2000s Brazil 1980s 2000s
Denmark 1960s 2000s Bulgaria 1990s 2000s
Finland 1960s 2000s Chile 1960s 2000s
France 1960s 2000s China 1970s 2000s
Germany 1960s 2000s Colombia 1960s 2000s
Greece 1960s 2000s Costa Rica 1960s 2000s
Iceland 1960s 2000s Czech Republic 1990s 2000s
Ireland 1960s 2000s Ecuador 1960s 2000s
Italy 1960s 2000s Egypt, Arab Rep. 1960s 2000s
Japan 1960s 2000s El Salvador 1960s 2000s
Netherlands 1960s 2000s Ethiopia 1980s 2000s
New Zealand 1960s 2000s Fiji 1960s 2000s
Norway 1960s 2000s Ghana 1960s 2000s
Portugal 1960s 2000s Guatemala 1960s 2000s
Spain 1960s 2000s Honduras 1960s 2000s
Sweden 1960s 2000s Hungary 1990s 2000s
Switzerland 1980s 2000s India 1960s 2000s
United Kingdom 1960s 2000s Indonesia 1960s 2000s























Taiwan Province of China 1970s 2000s
Tanzania 1960s 2000s
Thailand 1960s 2000s






Notes: This table reports the countries in the sample and the decades for which data are available for each
country.
42Table A2. Sectors
ISIC code Sector Name j j
15 Food and Beverages 0.315 0.281
16 Tobacco Products 0.264 0.520
17 Textiles 0.467 0.371
18 Wearing Apparel, Fur 0.493 0.377
19 Leather, Leather Products, Footwear 0.485 0.359
20 Wood Products (Excl. Furniture) 0.452 0.372
21 Paper and Paper Products 0.366 0.344
22 Printing and Publishing 0.484 0.469
23 Coke, Rened Petroleum Products, Nuclear Fuel 0.244 0.243
24 Chemical and Chemical Products 0.308 0.373
25 Rubber and Plastics Products 0.385 0.387
26 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.365 0.459
27 Basic Metals 0.381 0.299
28 Fabricated Metal Products 0.448 0.398
29C Oce, Accounting, Computing, and Other Machinery 0.473 0.390
31A Electrical Machinery, Communication Equipment 0.405 0.380
33 Medical, Precision, and Optical Instruments 0.456 0.428
34A Transport Equipment 0.464 0.343
36 Furniture and Other Manufacturing 0.460 0.407




Notes: This table reports the sectors used in the analysis. The classication corresponds to the ISIC Revision
3 2-digit, aggregated further due to data availability. j is the value-added based labor intensity; j is the
share of value added in total output. Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
43Table A3. Country-by-Country Estimates Relative Convergence, 1960s to 2000s
Country  s.e. Obs. R2 Speed of Convergence,
by decade
United Kingdom -0.831*** 0.188 19 0.469 0.444
Austria -0.964** 0.336 19 0.450 0.828
Belgium-Luxembourg -0.872*** 0.188 19 0.660 0.515
Denmark -1.025*** 0.166 19 0.692 {
France -0.738*** 0.198 19 0.343 0.335
Germany -0.753*** 0.138 19 0.527 0.350
Italy -0.320 0.208 19 0.160 0.096
Netherlands -0.772*** 0.182 19 0.563 0.370
Norway -1.028*** 0.062 19 0.917 {
Sweden -0.890*** 0.178 18 0.544 0.552
Canada -0.293 0.275 19 0.046 0.087
Japan -0.831** 0.304 18 0.296 0.444
Finland -0.684** 0.275 19 0.607 0.288
Greece -0.507** 0.189 19 0.343 0.177
Iceland -0.588** 0.215 15 0.439 0.222
Ireland -1.280*** 0.117 19 0.795 {
Portugal -0.435** 0.180 19 0.306 0.143
Spain -0.424*** 0.106 19 0.626 0.138
Turkey -0.379*** 0.128 18 0.350 0.119
Australia -0.242 0.166 19 0.110 0.069
New Zealand -0.199 0.126 19 0.165 0.055
South Africa -0.046 0.295 18 0.002 0.012
Bolivia -0.368*** 0.123 17 0.319 0.115
Chile -0.303*** 0.102 19 0.241 0.090
Colombia -0.308* 0.148 19 0.178 0.092
Costa Rica -0.441** 0.152 17 0.302 0.145
Ecuador -0.259*** 0.088 19 0.228 0.075
El Salvador -0.265* 0.131 18 0.097 0.077
Honduras -0.394* 0.216 17 0.144 0.125
Mexico -0.577** 0.193 13 0.391 0.215
Uruguay -0.270** 0.113 19 0.285 0.079
Venezuela, RB -0.309 0.181 19 0.222 0.093
Trinidad and Tobago -0.382 0.264 17 0.207 0.120
Iran, Islamic Rep. -0.461* 0.234 19 0.158 0.155
Israel -0.273 0.243 18 0.107 0.080
Jordan -0.521** 0.204 18 0.284 0.184
Kuwait -0.688*** 0.173 17 0.514 0.291
Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.328* 0.158 19 0.089 0.099
Sri Lanka 0.252 0.247 19 0.068 -0.056
India -0.326* 0.186 19 0.117 0.099
Indonesia -0.615*** 0.162 16 0.553 0.239
Korea, Rep. -0.801*** 0.135 19 0.628 0.404
Malaysia -0.708*** 0.192 19 0.308 0.308
Pakistan -0.379** 0.147 8 0.265 0.119
Philippines -0.582** 0.217 19 0.291 0.218
Thailand -1.151* 0.579 14 0.382 {
Ghana -0.041 0.203 18 0.002 0.010
Kenya -0.173 0.188 17 0.035 0.048
Mauritius -0.108 0.246 15 0.010 0.028
Tanzania -0.612** 0.227 12 0.419 0.237
Fiji -0.269* 0.150 15 0.091 0.078
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered in parentheses; ***: signicant at 1%; **: signicant at 5%; *:




1= over the period from the 1960s to the 2000s on its initial value, by country. The speed of convergence,
per decade, is reported in the last column. Missing values are due to the convergence coecient being larger
than 1.
44Table A4. Country-by-Country Estimates Relative Convergence, 1980s to 2000s
Country  s.e. Obs. R2 Speed of Convergence,
by decade
United Kingdom -0.836*** 0.203 19 0.478 0.904
Austria -0.617* 0.316 19 0.354 0.480
Belgium-Luxembourg -0.841*** 0.219 19 0.489 0.919
Denmark -0.778*** 0.188 19 0.516 0.754
France -1.164*** 0.222 19 0.493 {
Germany -0.698*** 0.172 19 0.451 0.598
Italy -0.303 0.355 19 0.074 0.181
Netherlands -0.465** 0.217 19 0.244 0.312
Norway -0.856*** 0.108 19 0.781 0.969
Sweden -0.519*** 0.114 18 0.514 0.366
Switzerland -1.106*** 0.177 13 0.687 {
Canada -0.516* 0.280 19 0.138 0.363
Japan 0.156 0.300 19 0.012 -0.073
Finland -0.419* 0.212 19 0.343 0.271
Greece -0.432*** 0.128 19 0.531 0.283
Iceland -0.706** 0.287 13 0.534 0.613
Ireland -0.797** 0.313 19 0.320 0.797
Portugal -0.230** 0.081 19 0.160 0.131
Spain -0.401* 0.200 19 0.390 0.257
Turkey -0.079 0.078 19 0.023 0.041
Australia -0.015 0.255 19 0.000 0.008
New Zealand 0.022 0.171 19 0.001 -0.011
South Africa -0.120 0.176 18 0.030 0.064
Argentina -0.017 0.087 19 0.001 0.008
Bolivia 0.008 0.079 19 0.001 -0.004
Brazil -0.273 0.250 16 0.131 0.160
Chile -0.222** 0.081 19 0.252 0.125
Colombia 0.019 0.115 19 0.003 -0.010
Costa Rica -0.356** 0.129 17 0.243 0.220
Ecuador -0.222 0.136 19 0.126 0.125
El Salvador 0.023 0.240 18 0.001 -0.011
Honduras -0.275 0.174 19 0.095 0.161
Mexico -0.395* 0.189 18 0.165 0.251
Peru 0.150 0.100 19 0.099 -0.070
Uruguay -0.137* 0.072 19 0.203 0.073
Venezuela, RB 0.249 0.187 19 0.072 -0.111
Trinidad and Tobago 0.031 0.154 18 0.002 -0.015
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.536* 0.295 19 0.153 -0.215
Israel 0.094 0.124 18 0.032 -0.045
Jordan -0.056 0.173 19 0.006 0.029
Kuwait -0.259 0.201 17 0.091 0.150
Saudi Arabia 0.020 0.414 18 0.000 -0.010
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.389 0.241 19 0.133 -0.164
Bangladesh -0.024 0.146 17 0.002 0.012
Sri Lanka 0.031 0.063 19 0.008 -0.015
Taiwan Province of China -0.115 0.258 19 0.014 0.061
India -0.059 0.212 19 0.005 0.030
Indonesia -0.241* 0.124 19 0.166 0.138
Korea, Rep. -0.533* 0.282 19 0.235 0.380
Malaysia -0.118 0.231 19 0.012 0.063
Pakistan -0.188 0.253 8 0.074 0.104
Philippines -0.158 0.229 19 0.024 0.086
Thailand 0.161 0.268 15 0.022 -0.075
Ethiopia -0.246* 0.136 17 0.183 0.141
Ghana -0.200 0.139 18 0.075 0.112
Kenya 0.068 0.124 17 0.015 -0.033
Mauritius -0.019 0.130 18 0.001 0.010
Senegal 0.086 0.160 17 0.013 -0.041
Tanzania 0.157 0.292 12 0.044 -0.073
Fiji -0.124 0.157 16 0.027 0.066
China -0.160 0.190 19 0.037 0.087
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered in parentheses; ***: signicant at 1%; **: signicant at 5%; *:




1= over the period from the 1980s to the 2000s on its initial value, by country. The speed of convergence,
per decade, is reported in the last column. Missing values are due to the convergence coecient being larger
than 1.
45